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Homicide~Evidence--Killing

in Perpetration of Burglary.
for murder ha~Pd on the
that the
in the (·ommissiou of burglary, tlte
after
down the door of a
from the facts and ein;umstances disdefendant's threat to
his u~e of a fence
t'llLry into the house,
the hou:oP, ;mch aR asking the
man for a drink while still holding the post in a
him on being informed that
and striking; the deeeased, the
JatPr having sexual intercourse

Weapon.--A deadly weapon is one likely to
or great bodily injury.
Id.~Deadly Weapon.---A fpnce post measuring 4 f('et 11
in length, 4 inches by 4 inches square and weighing
is a deadly weapon where it may be inferred from
eYidence that its possessor intended on a particular oc'"n~ion to HH' it me n wcapun sl10uld th(• eit'(·mnstnnl'('S require.
Burglary-Intent.-Burglary is committed when a person enhome "with intent to commit . . . any felony'' (Peu.
~ -159), and a pl'rsou is guilty of a felony when he comau assault on the person of another with a deadly
weapon or by any means of force likely to produce great
injury. (Pen. Code, § 2·16.)
Robbery-Intent: Burglary~Intent.~A spPcific intent to steal
essPntial dement of robbery, as distinguished from burwlwre the crime is complete when the one accused has
Hll(Tl'd the house of anothrr with intent to commit any felony.
Cal.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, § 10; Am.Jur., Assault
, ~ 34 ct seq.
Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 146(2); [2, 3] Assault,
Burglary, ~8:
llobhery, §4: Burglary, §8; [6]
~ 15(6): [7] Criminal Law, ~ 1404; [8] Criminal Law,
: [9] Crimin11l Law, ~1407; [10] Witness(•s, §133: [11]
Law, §1377(4); [12] Criminal Law, §1382; [13] Homi268.

C.2d
murder
of whether the person actually
killed was the person defendant intended to
and reoi whether the killing was intentional or accidental.
Criminal Law-- Appeal- Harmless Error
Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a murder case, misconduct of the
district attorney in
his voir dire examination
uf the
and during his
that a person
life sentence is eligible for
and can be on the
streets within seven years was nut prejudicial to defendant
where unJer the evidence no miscarriage of justice coulJ have
resulteJ therefrom. ( Const., art. VI, § 41.2.)
[8] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In a murder case, defendant was not prejudiced
by the closing argument of the district attorney stating that
the defense was trying to bring in by innuendo and by inference things that weren't there, that this was not evidence,
that the jury should weigh the evidence, and that the prosecution had given a codefendant the benefit of any doubt.
[9] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In a prosecution for murder based on the theory
that the killing was perpetrated in the commission of burglary, the district attorney was not guilty of prejudicial misconduct in giving an illustration of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of robbery, where his intent in
giving such an example was to illustrate to the jury that the
homicide committed in the course of such a felony does not
have to be of the Yictim of the felony itself in order to constitute the killing Hrst dPgrPe murder.
[10] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Extent.-The extent to which
cross-examination of a witness may be carried rests largely
in the discretion of the court.
[11] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Crossexamination.-Alleged error of the court in limiting the crossexamination of a clinical technologist concerning the alcoholic
content found in blood samples taken from the deceased
woman was not prejudicial where the evidence would have
been only cumulative of that showing that deceased had been
drinking on the day of her death.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Testimony of a
deputy sheriff who arrested defendant was not prejudicial or
inflammatory where he stated merely where he found defendant, that defendant appeared to be sober or "slightly
[10] SPe Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 620.
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influence" of
as to
he was there.

and that he informed de-

Homicide - Appeal - Harmless Error - Instructions.-In a
for n1urder based on the
in the commission of

it was not
that if defendant

then deceased was not
or attcompt to perpewhere the court instructed the
that every
who enters any house with intent to commit any felony
of
that the essence of a burglary is
with such specific intent, and that the crime
as soon as the entry is made
of whether
intent thereafter is carried out.
~APPEAIJ

(automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County
from an order denying a new trial. John A. IIe~wicker,
Affirmed.

Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
H(nrard A. lVIuhleman, under appointment by the Supreme
for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. TJinn,
Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse,
Attorney General, for Hespondent.
,J.-This is an automatic appeal (Pen. Code,
from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of San Diego
imposing the drath penalty.
DefPndant Engene Augustine 1\Iorloek was eharged with
thr murder of one ~Annie Moralrs; he \Yas also ehargecl with
and IYith assault with a deadly weapon ~with intent
her
to
George Piepa. He pleaded not guilty and not
reason of insanity to all three charges. After trial
he was found g11ilt;' as charged and sane at the time
commission of the offenses. A motion for a new tria 1
was made and clenied and a judgment imposing the cleat h
\\"aS rendere(l.
Thrre iR little or no dispute as to the faets. On ]\fay 11,
Gm; Pico, George Pi epa, Prank Cnrrvas, <tefrndant 's
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uncle, and Annie :Morales were
room dwelling on the Him~on Indian Heservation. At
mately 7 o'clock in the
defendant in the company
of Lindy Parcel (a codefendant) broke down the door of
the house with a fence
defendant had
up outside
and .which he used as a battering ram. He then asked
for a drink while still holding the
ner. Piepa informed him there was
upon defendant struck Piepa with his fists
the floor. The record disclosed that defendant \Yas
4 inches tall and
oyer 200 pounds. Annie
the common-law wife of Piepa, came through the
the next room and may have started to attack the
He thereupon struck her in the face with his fists knocking
her to the floor where he then kicked her three or four times in
the face with his steel-toed boots. He left her
on her
back on the floor of the bedroom >vhere she fell and went back
into the kitchen where he struck Piepa ·with the f1at side of
an axe he had found in the house and then kicked him.
Parcel took the axe a·way from him, but defendant found a
broken bread knife with which he proceeded to cut Piepa.
The knife was taken from him by Parcel. Defendant then
went into the bedroom ,,rhere he had sexual intercourse with
Annie Morales who had not moYed since defendant had beaten
and kicked her. Frank Cuervas then, at defendant's invitation, had intercourse with the unconscious woman. Defendant
and Prank then covered the woman ·with a blanket and left
after taking a bottle of wine from the house. Parcel testified
that before entering the house defendant said he \Yas going
to ''clobber'' Piepa because Pi epa had beaten his uncle .
.A. nnie Morales' face was crushed and her lips lacerated; she
suffered a fracture of the skull. Medical testimony was to
the effect that despite her severe injuries she could have lived
from one-half an hour to several hours after the wounds were
inflicted. Piepa, although severely beaten, recovered and
testified at the trial. Defendant did not take the stand in his
own defense. A transcription of answers by defendant to
questions asked him by a member of the sheriff's office was
admitted in evidence. There is no contention that the answers.
were not freely given. The questions and answers thereto fully
corroborate the facts heretofore set forth.
'l'he People argue that defendant was guilty of first degree
murder in that the death of Annie Morales occurred in the
commission of (1) burglary; (2) rape; and (3) mayhem.
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contends that the evidence
the mnrder occurred in the
; that the dis( rict
miseondnct; that the conrt
certain im;trnciions am1 in
defendant.

who commits an assault npon the person of
·weapon or instrument or
any means
to prod nee
bodily injmy is . . . "
'fhe nudisputt>(l rYi<lence sho•xs that defendnnt
into the house of Pi epa with a fen eo
\Yith the
HYowed intent to "elobber" Pi epa. Section 460 of the Penal
(
that any person armed with a dradl,Y ·weapon,
while in the commission of such burglary arms him.
a deadly weapon, or '"ho ·while in the commission of
bnrglary assaults any person'' is gnilty of burglary of
first degree. 'l'lle codefem1ant, Parcel, testified as to
drfelHlant's intent to assault Piera before
arrive(1 at
's house. He and defendant (in the interrogator~-) both
state<l that defendant armed himself ·with the fence ]!ost prior
Piepa 's house. [la] In a prosecution such as
the intent to commit a felony after bN•aking down the
am1 ('ntering may be inferrell from the facts aud circumdisclosed by the eYidcnee (People Y.
106
.App.2d 528 [2!3G P.2d 402]) which includes defendant's
to elobber Picpa, his use of the fence post, and his
l:(!ndnet upon entering the house. [2] A deadly weapon is
to
death or
bodily injury (People v.
68 Cal. 245; People v. Leyba, 74 Cal. 407 [16 P. 200] ).
v. Cook, 1G Cal.2d 507, 517 [102 P.2d 752], the
deceased met her death by being struck with a piece of hvo.
about 2 feet long. 'fhe court in the Cook case in
that the t\vo-by.four was a dea(11:- wea110n quoted from
V. Raleigh, 128 Cal.App. 105, 108, no [16 P.2c1 752].
follcnvs: "\Vhen it appears . . . that [such] an instru. . . is capable of being used in a 'dang·erous or
' manner, ancl it may be fairly inferrec1 from the rYithat its possessor intended on a TJ'1rticular occasion to
11sc it as a weapon should the eircumstances require, lYe believe
its eharacter as a 'dangerous or deadly weapon' may be
her \Yith a
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least for the purposes of that occasion.''
involved here measured 4 feet 11 inches
in
was 4 inches
4 inches square and weighed 10
pounds, and therefore comes well within the definition of a
''
weapon'' as defined in the
Defendant contends that if this was a
the crime
was
upon the
; that Annie Morales was, therenot killed in the
of
but was killed
in the
of an
Defendant's
contentions are without merit. The statute
Code, § 189)
that all murder which is committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate burglary is murder of the
first
[4] As we have heretofore pointed out burglary
is committed when a person enters any house "with intent to
commit ... any felony" (Pen. Code, § 459) and that section
245 of the Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of a
felony when he commits an assault upon the person of another
with a deadly weapon ''or by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury." [lb, 3b] It may justifiably be
inferred from the evidence here that defendant entered the
house of Piepa with intent to assault him \vith the fence post
with which he had armed himself prior to the entry and that
such fence post was a deadly weapon within the meaning of
the term. Defendant relies upon the rule set forth in People v.
Carnine, 41 CaL2d 384 [260 P.2d 16], where, in reversing
the judgment of conviction, we held that an instruction that
a killing was not first degree murder in the perpetration of
robbery if the thought of taking the money from the victim
occurred only after the termination of the attack, should have
been given. Defendant's argument is, apparently, that he
did not intend to assault Annie Morales when he entered the
house and that he formed the intent to steal the bottle of wine
after the assaults had been completed. [5] A specific intent
to steal is an essential element of the crime of robbery (People
v. Sanchez, 35 CaL2d 522 [219 P.2d 9]), as distinguished
from the crime of burglary, where the crime is complete when
the one accused has entered the house of another ·with intent
to commit any felony. [6] It is immaterial to the guilt of
defendant that Annie Morales was the one killed rather than
Piepa whom he intended to assault. \Ve said in People
Y. Coefield, 87 Cal.2d
868 1286 P.2d 570], that a killing is
murder of the first degree by force of section 189 of the Penal
Code, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental.
(See also People v.JJfilton, 145 Cal. 169 [78 P. 549]; People v.

[3a]

147

more
conviction on the
ed in the commission of
it is not necessary to discuss
eoniention that the evidence was insufficient to
tl1e homi('i(1e occurred in the
of either
\V c said in
v. Chavez, 37 CaL
672
P.2c1 632], quoting from People v.
Cal.App.2d 238, 255, 256 [130 P.2d 495], that
" '
Under the evidence, the
might appropriately have
appellant's guilt under any one of the three above
theories of grand theft as deflned by section 484 of
tlle Penal Code . . . . It was not necessary to require the
to agree upon the theory If, under any one of the
set forth,
believed appellant had gained possesof and appropriated to his own use the moneys of Pacific,
guilty of grand theft.' The same rule is applicable
to
various grounds upon which the jury could have found
Chayez guilty of murder in the first degree."
Defendant contends that the district attorney was
of prejudicial misconduct in his voir di1·e examination
of the jury when he made this statement: ''It [life imprisondoesn't mean, as it does in some other states, that you
arc ,:ommitted for the rest of your natural life. It means that
a person is eligible for parole within seven years; within seven
years
can be on the streets. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
'rhe district attorney then went on to inquire of the jurors if
would return a verdict imposing the death penalty if
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was
of first degree murder and found no extenuating
cireumstances. It is at once apparent that the district attorney
stated the law. The district attorney, in his
argument again referred to the fact that defendant,
a life sentence, might be able to walk the streets again
within scyen years. In People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal.2d 757 [214
813], we specifically noted that section 3046 of the
Code provides that "No prisoner imprisoned under a
life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven
years" (emphasis added) but that whether such
misstatement of the law was so prejudicial as to constitute

e are of the
that under the evidence
that defendant could haYe been preju\\' e do
howeYer,
It is obYious
more
familiar, with the criminal law than
rhat 1rhieh engages in the
of criminal cases, and
be said that a statement of the character made
in this case was the result of mere inadvertem~e.
If this 'were a case IYhcre
of guilt 'was
to hold that sueh a statewe would be
ment eonstituted prejudicial miscom1uct and justified a reversaL
illc record before us, however, we are disposed
to hold that the misconduct >Yas not prejudicial to defendant
and that a
of justice did not result therefrom
(Cal.
art. YI, §
).
Defendant contemls that the district attorney misstated
the evidence as it related to the rape count since there
il"aS no evidence that Anuie Morales was not the wife of
defendant. \Yhile \Ye do not deem it necessary to discuss
this contention be(•ause of our previous holding herein, the
record sho>YS that Annie Morales had been living ~with Piepa
for some years and does not show, or tend to show, that she
\Yas the wife of defendant.
[8] Defendant contends that the following statement
made by the district attorney in his closing argument was
"in essence, asking the ,Jury to find and administer the death
penalty because of the fact that the co-defendants were let off
and not charged the same as Appellant in this case; that
they >Yere giving them a 'break,' and that they should not
giYe Appellant a 'break' because the others were giYen a
'break.' " It is contended that this was highly prejudicial.
Apparently the part of the argument claimed to be prejudicial
is this: "Now what this defense is trying to do is bring in
by innuendo and by inference things that aren't there. I
asked you if you would consider the evidenee, the eYidence
alone, weigh the Court's instructions and arrive at your
decision. As I will sho>v you shortly there are innuendoes
that
aren't this way or that way. That is not evidence.
\Veigh the evidence and arriYe at your decision. Another
thing, remember this: Lindy [Parcel] ~was given every
benefit by our office when that complaint was signed. He was
charged with one count. He could haYe been charged with

ndicial misconduct an
of first
murder
. Tbe obdous intent
illustrate to thr
that
does
it::df in order to
the killing murder

supra, 37 Cal.2cl

V.

ans1wrs ihis contention made

contends that the court committed prejuerror in limiting his cross-examination of 1\Ir.
teclmologit<t, who \nts ea1led by tl1e
to
opinion coHeerning the alleged rape of iuwie Morales.
Def enclant sought to eross-examine l\lr. ?\akamura
the akohol eo11tent found in blood
takeu from the
wonun1. The conrt snstai1ted au
ioH on the
that the aleohol l'OlJtent of the victim's blood vvas
[10] It is, of course, \Yell settled that tbe extent to
eross-examination may be carried rest,;
in the
of the conrt. [11] En•u if this were 11ot so, the evi\YOnld have been only cumulative since the record
sbows that the deceased had been drinking on the day
drath.
the size of the defendant who was 6
inehes tall and wc>ighed owr 200 pounds and that of the
~wlJo \YHS ;) feet ;i inehes tall and
further eYidence of physieal
ou the part of (1efendant
not
']'here is no merit to defendant's contention that the
of the depnh'
who arrested i.lrfendant some
hours nfter tlw eornmission of the
was admitted
pn•jmliet' <UHl inflame the mim1s of tl1e
He
~w]H>re he found him, that he
to be
"slightly nuder thE' influence" of aleohol ancl that he
infonnec1 the ddeJH1aut as to why he ~was there.
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the defendant contends that the court comerror in
to instruct the
that
"If you find that the defendant . . . had not formed an
intention to enter the dwelling of
with
the intent to commit a felony, then you are instructed that
Annie Morales was not killed
the
to
,
P.2d 16]." The instruction was refused as
No error appears inasmuch as the court instructed the jury that ''
person who
enters any house or other building with intent to commit
any felony is guilty of burglary. The essence of a burglary
is entering a place such as I have mentioned with such
specific intent; and the crime is complete as soon as the
entry is made, regardless of whether the intent thereafter is
carried out.'' There
therefore, no merit to defendant's
contention since no error occurs in refusing to give an instruction when the instructions given adequately cover the subject
matter (People v. Steccone, 36 CaL2d 234 [223 P.2d 17];
People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676 [185 P.2d 1] ).
The judgment and order denying a new trial are afiirmed.
Gibson, C.•J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, ,J., and
McComb, .J., concurred.
Spence, .J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8,
1956.

